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Abstract
Public key cryptosystems in both classical and post-quantum settings usually
involve a lot of computations. The amount as well as the type of computations involved
vary among these cryptosystems. As a result, when the computations are performed on
processors or devices, they can lead to a wide range of energy consumption. Since a lot of
devices implementing these cryptosystems might have a limited source of power or energy,
energy consumption by such schemes is an important aspect to be considered.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is one of the most commonly used technique in
the classical setting of public key cryptographic shceme, and elliptic curve based Diffie-
Hellman (ECDH) has been in existence for more than three decades. An elliptic curve
based post-quantum version of Diffie-Hellman, called supersingular isogeny based Diffie-
Hellman (SIDH) was developed in 2011. For computations involved in ECDH and SIDH,
elliptic curve points can be represented in various coordinate systems. In this thesis, a
comparative analysis of energy consumption is carried out for the affine and projective
coordinate based elliptic curve point addition and doubling used in ECDH and SIDH. We
also compare the energy consumption of the entire ECDH and SIDH schemes.
SIDH is one of the more than sixty algorithms currently being considered by
NIST to develop and standardize quantum-resistant public key cryptographic algorithms.
In this thesis, we use a holistic approach to provide a comprehensive report on the energy
consumption and power usage of the candidate algorithms executed on a 64-bit processor.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Energy consumption is an important factor for any cryptographic scheme imple-
mented on devices having limited energy resources. Cryptographic protocols mostly involve
various mathematical computations based on certain algorithms. Implementations for such
algorithms in software or hardware require power and thereby they consume energy. In
the past, a lot of research work has been dedicated towards improving the efficiency of the
algorithms used in cryptographic schemes in terms of memory and speed. There has not
been much investigations on the energy consumption by public key cryptographic schemes,
when implemented in software. This energy consumption is dependent on both power
usage and their execution time.
The very idea of communicating securely on public channels was introduced in
1976 as Diffie-Hellman key exchange [51] which is based on the hardness of solving the
discrete logarithm problem. Elliptic curve based Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) is a protocol for
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key exchange and provides security in the classical setting. Using analogous ideas of key
exchange, an elliptic curve based quantum safe protocol was later developed which is
termed as supersingular isogeny based Diffie-Hellman (SIDH).
This thesis investigates the relative energy efficiency of ECDH and SIDH, where
SIDH in quantum safe and ECDH is not. We also consider the NIST organized post-
quantum cryptography (PQC) round 1 submissions (including SIDH which is submitted
as SIKE). Although public key cryptosystems such as RSA [103] are widely used, we do
not consider them in this work. Software implementations of these protocols are executed
on a 64 bit processor for this investigation.
1.2 Contributions
In the first part of this thesis, implementations of both ECDH and SIDH are
executed on a 64 bit processor in order to study their corresponding power and energy
consumption values. It is already known that representation of elliptic curve points using
projective coordinates are more efficient than affine coordinates with respect to execution
time. In this thesis, a detailed comparison of power usage and energy consumption be-
tween affine and standard projective coordinates while executing elliptic curve based point
doubling and addition is presented. In addition to this, we investigate the energy efficiency
of the overall SIDH and ECDH key exchanges using standard projective coordinates. This
work has been accepted at [20] and is also available on the CACR (Centre for Applied
Cryptographic Research, University of Waterloo) website [22].
Another contribution of this thesis is a consolidated report on power usage and en-
ergy consumption of candidate algorithms which were submitted to the NIST post-quantum
cryptography standardization process. In this investigation, optimized implementations of
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all the submitted signature schemes and encryption/encapsulation techniques are executed
on a 64 bit processor in order to accumulate their energy consumption data. This work is
under submission for possible publication and is also available on the CACR website [21].
1.3 Thesis organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides some preliminar-
ies on ECDH and SIDH. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the tools and methodologies used.
Chapter 4 presents our investigation results on power usage and energy consumption of
affine and projective coordinate based elliptic curve point addition and doubling, followed
by ECDH and SIDH power usage and energy requirements. Chapter 5 consists of an ex-
tensive comparison of the NIST round 1 submissions in terms of their energy consumption.
Finally concluding remarks are provided in Chapter 6. Scopes and possibilities of future
work related to this thesis are also added in the same chapter.
3
Chapter 2
Overview of elliptic curve based pre-
and post-quantuam cryptosystems
2.1 Introduction
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) was proposed in 1985 independently by Neal
Koblitz [76] and Victor Miller [92]. Since then a large variety of security implementations
in public key cryptography have been done using elliptic curves. ECC is used in many
practical applications [36] such as smart grids, vehicular communication, RFID, secure
shell (SSH) [111], transport layer security (TLS) [34] and Bitcoin [96]. Public-key algo-
rithms are particularly crucial since they provide digital signatures and establish secure
communication without requiring in-person meetings. ECC provides a secure means of
exchanging keys among communicating hosts using the Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange
algorithm referred to as ECDH [51]. The possibility of the emergence of quantum comput-
ers in the near future poses a serious threat against the security of widely-used public key
4
cryptosystems such as RSA and ECC.
Fortunately, there exist public key cryptographic algorithms that are believed
to be safe against quantum computer based attacks. Most of these quantum safe algo-
rithms are either code-, lattice-, hash- or multivariate-based. Amongst all the other known
post-quantum cryptosystems, an elliptic curve based algorithm has recently received con-
siderable attention. It relies on the Diffie-Hellman construction using the isogeny of super-
singular elliptic curves, referred to as SIDH [70]. The best known classical and quantum
attacks against the underlying Diffie-Hellman problem of SIDH are both exponential in the
size of the underlying finite field. This makes SIDH quite promising as a post-quantum
crypto candidate.
The fundamental operation underlying ECC is elliptic curve point multiplication,
which in turn uses point doubling and addition. An elliptic curve can be represented
using various coordinate systems [64]. For each such coordinate system, the formulae for
computing point addition and doubling are different, as a result the speed of computation
is also different. Therefore a good choice of coordinate system is an important factor for
elliptic curve point multiplications. The use of affine coordinates and projective coordinates
for elliptic curve point operations is well known [109]. To the best of our knowledge,
there has not been any work done that reports the power and energy consumption values
corresponding to the use of such coordinates. In this thesis, we provide insight into the
differences in energy consumption between affine and projective coordinate based point
addition and doubling used in ECDH and SIDH. We then use projective coordinates to
report the differences in energy consumption between the entire key exchange of ECDH
and SIDH.
We next provide details of the parameters that are used in the cryptographic
protocols of ECDH and SIDH. Both of these schemes involve scalar point multiplication,
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and are defined on different finite fields. However, SIDH requires isogeny evaluation and
computation, unlike the ECDH scheme.
2.2 ECDH scheme
Diffie–Hellman key exchange establishes a shared secret between the two commu-
nicating nodes that intend to securely exchange data over a public network. The scheme
uses the multiplicative group of integers modulo p, where p is prime [64]. The elliptic
curve Diffie–Hellman protocol is a variant that uses an additive group formed by points on
a suitably chosen elliptic curve instead of the multiplicative group of integers modulo p.
Elliptic curve based Diffie-Hellman protocol relies on the difficulty of computing
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [51]. The ECDLP is following:
Given an elliptic curve E defined over a finite field Fp, a point P of order n on E, and a
point Q that is a multiple of P , finding the integer l ∈ [0, n− 1], such that Q = lP .
The ECDH scheme works in the following way. Suppose Alice and Bob are communicating
over a public channel. The following are the parameters used :-
E = Chosen elliptic curve defined over Fp
P = publicly known base point on E of order n
a = Alice’s private key, known only to Alice, and chosen randomly from [0, n− 1]
b = Bob’s private key, known only to Bob, and chosen randomly from [0, n− 1]
aP = Alice’s public key
bP = Bob’s public key
abP = Shared secret key
ECC mainly exploits the algebraic structure of the elliptic curves over a finite
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field. Elliptic curve based cryptographic schemes use the smallest sized keys and as a
result is one of the most popular choices for many practical applications. In terms of
security, ECDLP is hard to solve and there is no polynomial time attack known against it.
Known classical attacks against the ECDLP have exponential time complexity.
There exist several standards on selecting safe curves for implementations in ECC.
The standard developed by NIST FIPS 186-2 [59] is used in this study. Based on their
standards, factors such as required security level, underlying prime field and appropriate
curve on that field are to be chosen. Elliptic curves can be either chosen from pseudorandom
curves or special curves. In the former one, coefficients of the curves are generated from
the output of a seeded cryptographic hash function SHA-1. And in case of special curves,
the coefficients and the underlying field are selected such that the efficiency of the elliptic
curve operations can be optimized. Pseudorandom curves can be defined over prime fields
of order p or any binary field of order 2m. Elliptic curves defined over binary fields provide
easier implementations, and many relevant algorithms and implementations have been
reported, e.g., [65], [48], [86]. However, there are some concerns that faster attacks might
be discovered [105], [73], [78]. Therefore pseudorandom elliptic curves defined over prime
fields are considered in this work, where the security level of the implementation is decided
by the size of the chosen prime.
In this study, implementation of ECDH is done such that it provides the classical
bit security of 128 and 192. We use the NIST recommended curves P-256 and P-384 in
this investigation [59]. The pseudorandom curves are in the short Weierstrass form [109]:
y2 = x3 + a · x+ b mod p (2.1)
This curve is defined over the field Fp, where p is a prime of length 256 bits or 384 bits for
providing 128 bits and 192 bits of security. The value of the coefficient b is also provided by
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NIST. The coefficient a is chosen to be -3, so that it would require fewer field computations
for elliptic curve point operations.
For the curve P-256, the prime used is p = 2256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1 [64]. The
value of the coefficient b and also the base point P = (gx, gy) is provided by NIST as follows:
b =0x5ac635d8aa3a93e7b3ebbd55769886bc651d06b0cc53b0f63bce3c3e27d2604b
gx =0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4a7c0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5
gy =0x4fe342e2fe1a7f9b8ee7eb4ac0f9e162bce33576b315ececbb6406837bf51f5
Similarly for P-384 the curve, the prime used is p = 2384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1.
The value of the coefficient b and also the base point P = (gx, gy) is given by:
b =0xb3312fa7e23ee7e4988e056be3f82d19181d9c6efe8141120314088f5013875ac65639
8d8a2ed19d2a85c8edd3ec2aef
gx =0xaa87ca22be8b05378eb1c71ef320ad746e1d3b628ba79b9859f741e082542a385502f
25dbf55296c3a545e3872760ab7
gy =0x3617de4a96262c6f5d9e98bf9292dc29f8f41dbd289a147ce9da3113b5f0b8c00a60b1
ce1d7e819d7a431d7c90ea0e5f
The prime p listed above have a special property such that they can be written
as the sum or difference of small numbers of the powers of 2, making reductions modulo p
easier.
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2.3 SIDH scheme
The basic idea of SIDH key exchange is based on Diffie-Hellman. However, the
properties of isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves over Fp2s are exploited to attain
quantum resistance. Security of SIDH depends on the following hard problem:
Given two supersingular elliptic curves, say E and E ′, defined over Fp2s , find an isogeny
φ : E → E ′ of degree l e where l=2 or 3.
An isogeny φ : E → E ′ is a rational map from the curve E to E ′ satisfying
φ(0) = 0 and φ(E) 6= 0 [109]. Two supersingular elliptic curves E and E ′ are isogenous to
each other over Fp2s if and only if #E(Fp2s) = #E
′(Fp2s), that is number of points on both
the isogenous elliptic curves are same. It should be noted that Fp2s is a quadratic extension
of the prime field Fps where the prime ps is of the form (lA
eA · lBeB±1) [47]. The integers lA
and lB are small primes which are in the case of SIDH are 2 and 3. The integers eA and eB
indicate the number of degree-lA and degree-lB isogenies to be computed at the sender and
receiver end, respectively. The extension field is formed as Fp2s = Fps(i) where i
2 + 1 = 0.
The order of the supersingular elliptic curve is (leAA · leBB )2. The choice of the underlying
field decides the security level of the implementation. For l ∈ {lA, lB} and e ∈ {eA, eB},
the SIDH secret keys are isogenies of the base curve E of degree le, which are in one-to-one
correspondence with the cyclic subgroups of EA,B(Fp2s) of order l
e, that form the kernels of
the isogeny [70]. In SIDH, the supersingular elliptic curves are all defined over Fp2s .
Given a finite subgroup H ⊆ E(Fp2s), there exists a unique separable isogeny
φ : E → E ′ with kernel(φ) = H; the degree of φ is |H|. Velu′s formula [115] can be used to
find the isogeny φ and the isogenous curve E ′ which is also denoted by E/H. For arbitrary
subgroups, Velu′s formula is computationally infeasible. Therefore this particular SIDH
implementation, that we have discussed in this thesis, uses isogenies over subgroups that
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are powers of 2 and 3. The Kummer variety of Montgomery curve, a special form of elliptic
curve has been used in the SIDH implementation.
Let A,B ∈ Fp2s satisfy B(A2− 4) 6= 0 in Fp2s (where the characteristic of Fp2s 6= 2).
The Montgomery curve EA,B defined over Fp2s is denoted by EA,B/Fp2s . The set of points
P = (x, y) are solutions in Fp2s to the curve equation
B · y2 = x3 + A · x2 + x (2.2)
The Montgomery curve used for SIDH has the coefficients A = 0 and B = 1. So the public
starting curve is
y2 = x3 + x (2.3)
This is a special instance of the Montgomery curve of order (2eA · 3eB)2 and eA and eB
are the two numbers that define the finite field Fp2s , where ps = 2
eA · 3eB − 1 [69]. In
this particular implementation, values of eA and eB are 250 and 159 for 128 bits classical
security level, and 372 and 239 for 192 bits security level.
Coming to the details of key exchange technique, suppose Alice and Bob wish to
communicate over a public channel. Then, the following are the parameters used:
 A prime ps of the form l
eA
A · leBB − 1
 A supersingular elliptic curve E0 defined over the field Fps2
 Fixed points PA, PB, QA and QB are selected randomly on the elliptic curve E0 such
that the order of the points PA and QA is l
eA
A and that of the points PB and QB is
leBB .
Furthermore, (PA, QA) are independent, which can be checked by computing the Weil
pairing e(PA, QA) in E0[l
eA
A ] and verifying that the result has order l
eA
A . Same thing is done
for PB and QB.
10
Next, during the key exchange at both the nodes, computation of isogeny mapping
of a particular degree is required, followed by generation of the isogenous curve. Given
below is a brief description of the sequence in which the computations are done at both
the ends by Alice and Bob:
1. Alice chooses mA, nA, randomly from [0, l
eA
A − 1], not both divisible by lA and com-
putes the isogeny φA : E0 → EA, where the kernel of φA is mA[PA] + nA[QA]
2. Next she evaluates φA(PB) and φA(QB) and transmits φA(PB), φA(QB) and the curve
EA to Bob
3. Similarly, Bob chooses mB, nB, randomly from [0, l
eB
B − 1], not both divisible by lB
and computes the isogeny φB : E0 → EB, where the kernel of φB is mB[PB]+nB[QB]
4. Bob evaluates φB(PA) and φB(QA) and transmits them along with the curve EB to
Alice
5. After receiving φB(PA), φB(QA) and EB from Bob, Alice computes φAB : EB → EAB
where the kernel of φAB is mAφB(PA) + nAφB(QA)
6. In the same way, Bob computes φBA : EA → EBA where the kernel of φBA is
mBφA(PB) + nBφA(QB)
7. Finally both the nodes compute the shared secret key as the j-invariant of the final
evaluated isogenous curve, i.e., EAB for Alice and EBA for Bob. By the properties of
isogenies we have j(EAB) = j(EBA).
Above is the basic idea behind the key exchange. There has been quite an amount of
research done for further compressing the key sizes, decreasing the amount of computations
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involved, increasing speed of implementation etc. [3], [58], [15]. The mathematical details
involved in the computation of isogenies is beyond the scope of this thesis. Interested
readers might want to refer to [47], [32], [50], [45], [71], [70], [69] as a sample of recent
research.
2.4 Comparative remarks
It must be noted that although both the key exchanges involved in ECDH and
SIDH operate on the basic idea of Diffie-Hellman, they have fundamental differences in
terms of the algorithms used. In case of ECDH, there is a requirement for elliptic curve
based scalar point multiplication. Scalar point multiplication is computing k ·Q where Q is
a point on the elliptic curve and k is an integer. It is used in ECC as a means of producing
a one-way function. Various algorithms are available for this computation such as:
 Double and add [64]
 Windowed method
 Sliding window method
 w-ary non-adjacent form (w-ary NAF)
 Montgomery ladder [93]
The first one mentioned above (double and add algorithm) is the simplest technique known.
The other techniques mentioned provide some kind of optimization. Montgomery ladder
for point multiplication computes in fixed amount of time, thereby protecting the system
from side channel attacks [77]. In w-ary non-adjacent form (w-ary NAF), the points are
12
Table 2.1: Sizes of keys and the primes used in ECDH and SIDH [47] protocols
Classical bit security level
ECDH (Length of keys and primes in bits) SIDH (Length of keys and primes in bits)
Prime Private Key Public Key Shared Secret Key Prime Private Key Public Key Shared Secret Key
128 256 256 512 256 503 256 3024 1008
192 384 384 768 384 751 384 4512 1504
represented in a different form in order to reduce the number of operations required for
point multiplication [33]. In this investigation we have used the simplest algorithm, namely
double and add, for scalar point multiplication in ECDH. The reason behind using this is
discussed later in Section 4.1. Moreover, it should also be noted that all the computations
in ECDH are done on a fixed elliptic curve, which is known publicly.
For SIDH, there are multiple isogenous elliptic curves involved. Each time the
scalar point multiplication is performed on a different curve. The main operations involved
in this technique, which are different from the aforementioned ones, are:
 Computing isogenies of degrees leAA and l
eB
B
 Evaluating isogenies of degrees leAA and l
eB
B
Both of these are computed using Velu’s formula [115]. The degree of isogeny computed at
both the communicating nodes are different which imply Alice and Bob perform different
kinds of computations, unlike ECDH. As mentioned before, in this work we are considering
the classical bit security levels of 128 and 192. Table 2.1 provides the public, private and
shared secret key sizes used for both the security levels with ECDH and SIDH. The public
key size is almost 6 times larger for SIDH than for ECDH for the same level of security.
This demands extra storage in the device that implements the scheme. Private keys are of
same size but the shared secret key of SIDH is around 4 times larger than the ones used
in ECDH [69], [47].
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter we have provided preliminary details of ECDH and SIDH, both
of which are based on the same fundamental key exchange technique. The overall key
exchange sequence used in both the schemes are also provided. The internal details of
the isogeny computation of SIDH has been ignored, as we are only concentrating on the
comparison of the two schemes on the basis of their energy efficiency.
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Chapter 3
Tools and methodologies
3.1 Overview
When a program is executed on a general purpose processor or CPU, the latter
draws power from an energy source, such as a battery. The energy consumed by the
processor to execute the program is essentially the product of the average power usage
(or consumption) and the execution time. In this section, we provide a brief overview of
various factors that affect the processor’s power usage and tools available to monitor the
power.
Today’s CPUs are based on Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS)
Technology. CMOS technology theoretically only dissipates power when switching of states
occurs accounting for the dynamic power of CPU. There is however also some leakage which
is known as static power. Therefore, the total power dissipation can be written as:
CPUTotalPowerDissipation = PowerDynamic + PowerStatic
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The static power dissipation depends mostly on these two factors:
 Subthreshold conduction
 Tunneling current through gate oxide layer
It has been determined that this tunneling power dissipation is one of the major components
of power dissipation. As the size of processors is getting smaller, the metal oxide layer
becomes thinner, making it easier for electrons to tunnel through the insulating layer. So
at a particular supply voltage, tunnelling is the largest factor of leakage. On the other
hand, the former situation arises when the transistor is in subthreshold region, by leakage
of current between the source and the drain.
Dynamic power dissipation is controlled by factors such as:
 Transition
 Short-circuit power dissipation
where transition power arises from the voltage source charging up the gates as if it is
a capacitor and then the capacitor discharging to the ground following the equation
Ptransition = 0.5 · C · V 2
Interestingly, different types of power measurement counters (core and uncore)
are available on the smartphone, laptop, desktop and other hardware. These performance
counters are used to provide information about how a particular operating system or the
related applications are functioning on a real-time basis. They can monitor power usage
when a particular instruction or process gets executed. Some of the performance counters
that affect power usage in a mobile device are as follows:
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 Instructions per cycle (IPC): Power usage of a processor is dependent on its activity.
If IPC is high, the processor is likely to use more power.
 Fetch counters: Processors execute huge number of instructions speculatively. In
case of branches in codes, branch prediction mechanism has a role to play. So,
the fetched instructions, branch correct predictions (BCP), branch mis-predictions
(BMP) contribute to power consumptions.
 Miss/Hit counters: Upon cache misses, the processor stalls. Thus, the events such
as cache hits, cache miss, TLB (Translation Lookaside Buffer) miss may impact the
power consumed.
 Retired instructions counters: Depending on the type of the retired instructions,
different functional units are exercised. If some of these executions are power-hungry
then they can influence power consumption.
 Stalls : Processors stall due to dependencies cause some power usages.
There are some software/hardware options available for monitoring or measuring the bat-
tery discharge rate while the program is executed on a laptop or any other processor.
Most of the Intel chips since the introduction of the SandyBridge architecture, have RAPL
(Running Average Power Limit) feature. This is primarily an estimation of the power used,
although some Haswell server models apparently have actual power measurement due to
onboard voltage regulation. The primary intent of RAPL is to control power usage on a
chip, but it also has power and energy measurement capabilities that make it interesting
for Performance Application Programming Interface (PAPI) [114]. This PAPI is a plat-
form independent interface, available to monitor the processor events and relate software
processes with the hardware in almost real time. The PAPI RAPL provides power data by
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relying on the values of RAPL MSR (Model Specific Registers). Mainly two basic types of
events can be reported from RAPL. They are:
 Dynamic energy readings from various components of the chip (PACKAGE ENERGY ),
DRAM (DRAM ENERGY ), CPU (PP0 ENERGY ), GPU (PP1 ENERGY ) etc.
 Static fixed values for thermal specifications, maximum and minimum power caps,
and time windows over which power is monitored.
Software is available to read and monitor such power usage values while the machine
executes instructions. For Unix based operating systems some of the exclusively available
power monitoring options are:
 Powerstat [75]: This is a program that measures the power consumption of a mo-
bile processor that has a battery power source. After monitoring, it calculates the
average, standard deviation and min/max of the gathered power usage data. There
are options provided in its syntax to specify the sampling frequency, duration, etc.,
during measurement.
 PowerTop [110]: This is a terminal-based diagnosis tool developed by Intel that
helps to monitor power usage by programs running on a Linux system when it is
not plugged on to a power source. An important feature of this piece of software is
that it provides an interactive mode which allows a user to experiment with different
power management settings.
 LibMSR [83]: This tool provides a convenient interface to access MSRs and to utilize
their full functionality. The main target was Intel SandyBridge processor. Later,
there have been plans to provide support for other generation processors as well.
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Next, the available options to monitor power usage on both Windows and Ubuntu are as
follows:
 Microsoft joulemeter [62]: This software based power monitoring tool, developed by
Microsoft, can measure energy impact on disk, CPU, screen etc. It can also be used
with desktops, but in that case an expensive piece of hardware, known as Watt’s Up
Meter would also be required.
 Intel’s performance counter monitor (PCM) [116]: This provides sample C++ rou-
tines and utilities to estimate the internal resource utilization. PCM tool reports
energy consumed by the socket and DRAM in the last one second. Therefore, the
energy consumed by the system in the last one second is also a measure of power
(energy per second). The performance output and the power usage can also be saved
in .csv format. This software is responsible to monitor several other events also in
abstraction.
 Intel power gadget [119]: This is a software-based power usage monitoring tool en-
abled for Intel Core processors (from 2nd Generation up to 7th Generation Intel Core
processors) developed by Seung-Woo Kim et al. It is available for Windows, Ubuntu
and Mac platforms. It gives accurate power usage data at user defined sampling rate
and for desired time duration. Therefore, it is used in this work.
 Energy consumption tool, Visual Studio 2013: This package is part of the Perfor-
mance Profiler of Visual Studio 2013. However, this CPU Usage tool works on only
Desktop apps and Windows Store apps exclusively.
In addition to the above mentioned options, there have been other arrangements used in the
past to get power and energy measurements precisely from laptops. For example, Farkas et
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al. [56] described the use of a shunt resistor to be inserted in series with the power source
or battery of the laptop. Next, a precise voltmeter would measure the voltage values over
the resistor continuously. Power used could be evaluated using Ohm’s law. This technique
was further validated in [55].
3.2 Intel power gadget
This gadget was developed for Windows, Ubuntu and Mac. But currently the
Ubuntu version is not working properly. Hence, the application of version 3.5 for Windows
operating system is used in our work to monitor the power usage with this application.
The Windows version is considered to be an accurate data logger and also flexible for usage
according to user reviews from Intel Applications Forum. Figure 3.1 is a screenshot of the
application showing the graphs of power consumption while being used.
This gadget includes an application, driver and libraries to monitor and estimate
real-time processor package power information in Watts using the energy counters in the
processor, which is collected at a user defined sampling rate and logged onto a .csv file.
There are additional features that include estimation of power on multi-socket systems. The
multi-socket support essentially evaluates the energy from MSR on a per-socket basis and
provides an estimate of power drawn per socket. So, the data that can be extracted from
the gadget outputs are: processor power (Watts), temperature (Celsius), CPU Utilization,
DRAM Power and frequency (MHz) in real-time via graph displayed in the GUI. It also
allows to log the power and frequency measurements and save it in csv format. C/C++
Application Programming Interface (API) is also available in this gadget, for accessing this
power and frequency data in programs.
It has been noticed that the power consumption values are negligible prior to
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execution of the codes for the purpose of monitoring power usage. And once the program
execution starts, the power usage value rises which is reflected on the topmost display dial
of the gadget.
3.3 Experimental details
In this section, we focus on describing the procedure that is adopted in this
investigation. As mentioned above, the power usage is monitored using the Intel gadget.
Also, Windows operating system is used for building and executing all the implementations,
as only the Windows version of the power gadget has been providing accurate results.
In terms of the C implementations that are executed, Linux Subsystem is used as
the platform. Linux Subsystem(Ubuntu 16.04) is a compatibility layer for running Linux
binary executables natively on Windows (we used Windows 10). The complier that we are
using is gcc 5.4 on Intel i7-6700 Skylake, 64 bit processor. Windows based platforms like
Eclipse or Visual Studio have certain constraints, which make the process of compilation
more complicated, especially when the NIST based submissions were designed keeping in
mind Unix based system. So in order to maintain consistency, all the programs in this work
is executed on the Ubuntu platform through the subsystem. Therefore, while executing
the programs, the power usage is tracked simultaneously using Intel power gadget 3.5
and logged in .csv files with a sampling resolution of 50 msecs. After each session of
logging power data, the average power consumed is considered for computation of energy
consumption, at each instance.
Implementations of elliptic curve based point addition and doubling are done
using standard projective coordinates and affine coordinates. These computations are
done for both ordinary elliptic curve of Weierstrass form (as used by ECDH) and for
21
Figure 3.1: Intel power gadget 3.5 interface
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supersingular elliptic curve, which is considered in Kummer variety of Montogomery curve
(as used in SIDH). Next, power profiling along with benchmarking of their execution time
is done. The coordinate system that consumes the least energy is then used to represent
points on elliptic curve, in the ECDH and SIDH schemes, in order to compare their relative
energy efficiency during the key exchange.
Furthermore, the same idea is extended to investigate the energy consumption of
the NIST round 1 PQC submissions. Initially there had been 69 submissions, out of which
5 were broken in terms of security by the time NIST held the first post-quantum cryptogra-
phy standardization conference in April 2018. In this study, we omit those five submissions.
All candidate algorithms include software implementations for different security levels men-
tioned by NIST. It has been tested that the execution times of the implementations do
not depend on whether Ubuntu operating system or Linux Subsystem is used. So, energy
consumption is reported for all these schemes, and categorized, based on their security
levels, encryption, encapsulation or signature techniques etc. It should be noted that the
implementations that have been considered are only based upon the submissions to round
1 of the standardization process, and do not take into consideration any optimizations and
changes that might have been subsequently incorporated.
3.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have provided the available options for tools/gadgets, which can monitor
power consumption on software devices. In addition, the functioning of Intel power gadget
along with the procedure adopted for this investigation has also been described.
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Chapter 4
Comparative study on energy
consumption of ECDH and SIDH
4.1 Preliminaries
Since all the elliptic curve based operations rely mostly on the points chosen on
the curve, representation of the points play an important role in the overall performance
of the cryptographic scheme. Through energy efficiency analysis, we show that projective
coordinate based points are far more efficient than affine coordinate based operations in
terms of power and energy consumption. Hence, in order to investigate the energy con-
sumption of ECDH and SIDH, we implement them using standard projective coordinates
(also known as projective coordinates).
Elliptic curve point operations are one of the most important steps in both the
cryptosystems. The computation of SIDH is adapted from Microsoft’s implementation [47].
On the other hand, ECDH is implemented using the regular “double and add” algorithm
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[91] for public key and shared secret key generation. Power consumption corresponding
to these schemes is then recorded while the code is executed on the above mentioned
processor. Energy efficiency is analyzed by considering the cumulative power consumption
throughout the execution of these algorithms.
With respect to energy efficiency of ECDH, OpenSSL’s implementation [2] has
also been considered. Since such implementations have undergone a lot of improvements
and optimizations in terms of speed over a long period of time, it doesn’t lead to a fair
comparison with current SIDH implementations, which is still in the process of getting
optimized. Moreover, unlike Microsoft’s SIDH implementation, ECDH implementation
by OpenSSL uses Jacobian projective coordinates and w-ary Non-adjacent form(w-NAF)
based point multiplication. Therefore, in this paper, in order to make a sensible com-
parison, ECDH is implemented with regular scalar point multiplication using standard
projective coordinates on short Weierstrass form of elliptic curve defined on a prime field
with primes of size 256 bits for 128 bit classical security level and 384 bits for 192 bit
security level.
For the case of SIDH, computations are done on the curves defined over the
quadratic extension of a prime field. From this point onwards, in this work we will refer to
the Kummer variety of Montgomery curve used for SIDH implementation as C-5032 and
C-7512 when the length of the prime ps corresponding to the underlying field Fp2s is 503
bits and 751 bits respectively.
A slightly different version of this work has been accepted by IEEE TrustCom
2018 [20]. In this thesis all the implementations are built on Linux Subsystem and compiled
using gcc 5.4, whereas in the TrustCom paper the implementations were built using Visual
Studio 2015. Different compilers have resulted in some changes in figures of the tables, but
the trend of overall investigation deductions remain very similar.
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4.2 Elliptic curve point addition and doubling
Affine coordinates are the most basic coordinate representation wherein a point
P on the curve is comprised of the x and y coordinates that is (xp, yp), whereas standard
projective coordinates are represented as P = (X : Y : Z) and Z 6= 0. The latter can
be converted to the affine form as x = X/Z, y = Y/Z. In the projective case, since the
coordinate is in the form of a ratio, there is no unique way to represent an affine point with
projective coordinates. This also leads to some loss in information. However, in projec-
tive coordinates, there is no requirement for performing inversions of field elements while
performing point doubling or point addition, which helps to reduce the cost of the opera-
tions to some extent, as each inversion computation takes more time than multiplication
or squaring operations.
4.2.1 Point addition and doubling for ECDH
In ECDH, the short Weierstrass curve (see Equation 2.1) is used. In this section,
we provide the formula required to perform elliptic curve point addition and point doubling
on this curve. Let the point getting doubled be P (xp, yp) and after doubling Q(xq, yq) =
2 · P . Then (xq, yq) can be expressed as follows [64]:
λ =
3 · x2p + a
2 · yp
xq = λ
2 − 2 · xp
yq = λ · (xp − xq)− yp
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In case of point addition, let the two distinct input points be P (xp, yp) and Q(xq, yq). After
addition let R(xr, yr) = P +Q. Then (xr, yr) can be computed as follows:
λ =
yq − yp
xq − xp
xr = λ
2 − xp − xq
yr = λ · (xp − xr)− yp
Next, we present the formulae for point doubling using standard projective coordinates [30]
on the same curve. Now while using standard projective coordinates, the elliptic curve
which was in the short Weierstrass form can be represented as
Y 2 · Z = X3 + a ·X · Z2 + b · Z3 (4.1)
Let the point getting doubled be P (XP , YP , ZP ) and after doubling be Q(XQ, YQ, ZQ) =
2 · P . Then, (XQ, YQ, ZQ) can be written as follows [46] :
XQ = 2 · YP · ZP [9 · (XP 2 − ZP 2)2 − 8 ·XP · YP 2 · ZP ]
YQ = 3 · (XP 2 − ZP 2) · [12 ·XP · YP 2 · ZP−
9 · (XP 2 − ZP 2)2]− 8 · YP 4 · ZP 2
ZQ = 8 · YP 3 · ZP 3
In case of point addition using projective coordinates, let the points getting added be
P (XP , YP , ZP ) andQ(XQ, YQ, ZQ), after addingR(XR, YR, ZR) = P+Q. Then, (XR, YR, ZR)
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can be expressed as [46]:
U = YQ · ZP − YP · ZQ
V = XQ · ZP −XP · ZQ
A = U2 · ZP · ZQ − V 3 − 2 · V 2 ·XP · ZQ
XR = V · A
YR = U · (V 2 ·XP · ZQ − A)− V 3 · YP · ZQ
ZR = V
3 · ZP · ZQ
4.2.2 Point addition and doubling for SIDH
The supersingular elliptic curve used in the SIDH protocol was defined in Section
2.3 by Equation 2.2. The formulae for point doubling on affine coordinates are given
below. Let the point getting doubled be P (xp, yp) and after doubling Q(xq, yq) = 2 · P .
The coordinates (xq, yq) can be computed as [97] :
λ =
3 · x2p + 2 · A · xp + 1
2 ·B · yp
xq = B · λ2 − A− 2 · xp
yq = (3 · xp + A) · λ−B · λ3 − yp
In case of point addition, the two distinct input points be P (xp, yp) and Q(xq, yq). After
point addition let R(xr, yr) = P +Q; then (xr, yr) can be expressed as [97]:
λ =
yq − yp
xq − xp
xr = B · λ2 − A− xp − xq
yr = (2 · xp + xq + A) · λ−B · λ3 − yp
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Kummer variety of Montgomery curves were used for the purpose of avoiding computations
involving y-coordinates. Therefore, using projective coordinates, let the point getting
doubled be P (XP , ZP ) and after doubling be Q(XQ, ZQ) = 2 · P . This point doubling
algorithm also takes as input two constants A and C, that depend on the curve being
used. Then, the resultant coordinates of point Q can be represented as [93]
XQ = C · (XP − ZP )2 · (XP + ZP )2
ZQ = 4 ·XP · ZP · [A · 4 ·XP · ZP + C · (XP − ZP )2]
Let the points getting added be P (XP , ZP ) and Q(XQ, ZQ), after adding R(XR, ZR) =
P +Q. This point addition algorithm takes an extra input that is coordinates of the point
P − Q (XP−Q : 1), where the z-coordinate is assumed to be 1. The resultant point R’s
coordinates can be computed as follows [93] :
XR = [(XP + ZP ) · (XQ − ZQ) + (XP − ZP ) · (XQ + ZQ)]2
ZR = (XP−Q) · [(XP + ZP ) · (XQ − ZQ)−
(XP − ZP ) · (XQ + ZQ)]
Based on the above given formulae, point addition and doubling are implemented on both
the curves. The corresponding results on energy efficiency are presented above in Tables
4.1 and 4.2.
4.3 Effect of coordinate systems on power and energy
consumptions
In this section we discuss the power and energy consumption of elliptic curve
point additions and point doublings corresponding to the curves used in ECDH and SIDH
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Table 4.1: Power and energy consumption using affine and projective coordinates on the
ECDH curves P-256 and P-384
Operations
128 bits 192 bits
Power(Watts) Energy(mJoules) Power(Watts) Energy(mJoules)
Affine Projective Affine Projective Affine Projective Affine Projective
Doubling 25.43 25.21 8.62 0.21 26.77 26.01 27.31 0.49
Adding 26.55 25.86 8.73 0.17 27.41 25.74 27.95 0.54
Table 4.2: Power and energy consumption using affine and projective coordinates on the
SIDH curves C-5032 and C-7512
Operations
128 bits 192 bits
Power(Watts) Energy(mJoules) Power(Watts) Energy(mJoules)
Affine Projective Affine Projective Affine Projective Affine Projective
Doubling 26.78 25.21 69.09 1.535 27.77 26.38 168.02 2.26
Adding 26.70 26.48 66.21 1.353 27.39 25.17 162.42 2.15
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for both the security levels of 128 and 192. The notation used in this section is given in
Section 4.1.
4.3.1 Non-supersingular elliptic curves P-256 and P-384
As mentioned earlier, in case of ECDH an elliptic curve in the short Weierstrass
form [38] is used, defined by Equation 2.1. Using double and add algorithm, any scalar
point multiplication performed on points defined on elliptic curve is basically point addition
and point doubling. Table 4.3 provides the comparison on number of operations such as
multiplications, inversions and squarings, that are required on Fp for point doubling and
point addition using the affine and projective coordinates on the ordinary elliptic curve, to
be used in ECDH. Here, p is a prime of size either 256 bits or 384 bits, as recommended
in [59]. The number of multiplications refer to only the finite field multiplications involved.
Table 4.3: Number of prime field operations used in affine and standard projective coordi-
nates based point addition and doubling for the ECDH curves.
Instructions
Affine Coordinate Projective Coordinate
Double Add Double Add
Multiplication 2 2 7 12
Squaring 2 1 3 2
Addition 4 0 11 1
Subtraction 4 6 5 6
Inversion 1 1 0 0
Inversions are computed on the prime field by using Fermat’s Little Theorem [6]. Since
affine coordinates involve inversions, they are naturally slower, which gets reflected in
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their overall energy consumption as well (refer to Table 4.1). It can be seen that affine
coordinates requires marginally more power for all its computations when compared to
projective coordinate based computations. In terms of energy, it requires on average around
45 to 55 times more energy than what projective coordinate based computations consume
over the curves P-256 and P-384. These figures of energy consumption are mostly affected
by the clock cycles required for the respective computations.
4.3.2 Supersingular elliptic curves C-5032 and C-7512
All the computations are performed on points over Montgomery curves as used
in SIDH scheme (refer to Equation 2.3). Affine points on elliptic curves are represented
as P = (x, y) where each x and y coordinate is an element of Fp2s . Similarly projective
Kummer coordinates [47] are represented as (X : Z), where each of the coordinate is an
element of Fp2s .
Let two elements on Fp2s be M = m0 + i · m1 and N = n0 + i · n1 , where
m0,m1, n0, n1 ∈ Fps and i2 + 1 = 0. Finite field operations involving these elements in Fps
are as follows
(a) Addition/Subtraction of M and N is
M +N = (m0 + i ·m1)± (n0 + i · n1)
= (m0 ± n0) + i · (m1 ± n1)
i.e., it requires two additions/subtractions in Fps .
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(b) Multiplication of M and N (using the Karatsuba scheme [74]) can be performed as
M ·N = (m0 + i ·m1) · (n0 + i · n1)
= (m0 · n0 −m1 · n1)+
i · ((m0 +m1) · (n0 + n1)−m0 · n0 −m1 · n1)
requiring three multiplications, three additions (one of size 2|ps| and the other two
of size |ps| each, where |x| is the bit-length of x) and two subtractions of size 2|ps|
on Fps .
(c) Squaring M on Fps will be done as follows
M2 = (m0 + i ·m1)2
= (m0 +m1) · (m0 −m1) + i · (2 ·m0 ·m1)
It requires two multiplications, two additions (one of size 2|ps| and the other of size
|ps|) and one subtraction of size |ps|.
(d) Inverting M can be done as follows
M−1 = m0 · (m02 +m12)−1 − i ·m1 · (m02 +m12)−1
So, inversion of an element of Fp2s on Fps , requires one inversion, two multiplications,
two squarings and one addition of size 2|ps|.
In other words, if the operations on the field Fp2s are translated to the field Fps
they turn out to be as shown below in Table 4.4.
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Table 4.4: Number of prime field operations used in affine and projective coordinates based
point addition and doubling for the SIDH curve
Instructions
Affine Coordinate Projective Coordinate
Double Add Double Add
Multiplication 27 19 16 13
Squaring 2 2 0 0
Addition 46 26 20 19
Subtraction 24 31 14 14
Inversion 1 1 0 0
Since the comparisons are done with ECDH only point doubling and addition is
focused in this paper. However, point tripling (not generally required in ECDH) is also an
important and time consuming operation in SIDH, which was optimized in [58]. Table 4.2
provides the power and energy consumed for these operations. Here also it can be seen that
energy consumption in elliptic curve point operations using affine coordinates is around 40
to 65 times more compared to that using projective coordinates on the curves of C-5032
and C-7512. So, Table 4.1 and Table 4.2’s data further validates the energy efficiency of
standard projective coordinates compared to affine coordinates.
4.4 Energy consumption of ECDH and SIDH
As per the deductions in Section 4.3, in order to achieve better energy efficiency,
all the implementations of the algorithms in both SIDH and ECDH are done using standard
projective coordinates. The basic elliptic curve point operations use the same formulae as
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Table 4.5: Comparison of power (in Watts) and energy (in milliJoules) consumption be-
tween ECDH and SIDH for 128 and 192 bit security levels
Cryptographic operations
128 bits 192 bits
ECDH SIDH ECDH SIDH
Power Energy Power Energy Power Energy Power Energy
Alice’s Public Key 25.19 63.02 26.83 2796.6 25.87 175.64 27.23 10177.93
Bob’s Public Key 25.01 62.38 26.33 3101.1 26.42 176.83 26.97 10141.16
Alice’s Shared Secret 25.04 63.13 26.68 2667.42 26.06 176.62 27.26 8892.72
Bob’s Shared Secret 25.23 61.94 26.41 2510.46 25.86 176.26 27.33 9307.5
mentioned in Section 4.2. Table 4.5 compares the energy and power consumption between
the cryptographic schemes. SIDH consumes slightly more power than ECDH for both
the cases. However the energy consumption between them has a huge difference. The
comparison has been done at the four major steps of key exchange that is initial key
generation by both the parties, followed by the generation of shared key secret.
The aspect of energy consumption is dependent on both the power and time of
execution. SIDH consumes a lot more energy than ECDH, where mostly the execution
time corresponding to the individual steps in the schemes influence this difference. The
isogeny evaluation and computation is one of the most time consuming steps. Table 4.6
provides the ratio of average power and energy used by SIDH cryptosystem to the ECDH
cryptosystem. The comparison is done here on the basis of energy consumed by each
operation in both ECDH and SIDH. An ECDH operation refers to a public key generation
or a shared secret key generation at any of the node (Alice or Bob), involved in the secured
communication. In case of ECDH, it is a point multiplication which involves a series of
point doubling and point additions. ECDH operations at both the ends of Bob and Alice
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Table 4.6: Ratios of power and energy consumption for each SIDH operation compared to
each ECDH operation
Bit Security
SIDH/ECDH
Power Energy
128 1.05 44.22
192 1.07 54.61
depend upon the private key which is being used for the point multiplication. Mostly, the
time and energy consumed for such public key generation is similar at both the ends.
However in SIDH, when Alice and Bob compute their public keys, evaluation and
computation of isogenies of different degrees are involved. In this particular implementation
Alice computes isogenies using a kernel, generated by a point of order 2 on the supersingular
elliptic curve while Bob uses a kernel, generated by a point of order 3 on the same curve.
As mentioned before the prime used in this scheme is of the form p = lA
eA · lBeB − 1.
Therefore, Alice evaluates isogenies of degree lA
eA and Bob evaluates isogenies of degree
lB
eB respectively. So eA isogenies of degree lA and eB isogenies of degree lB are computed.
The finite field operations involved in this isogeny computations of different degrees are also
different. As a result unlike ECDH operations, Alice and Bob end up requiring different
amounts of time and energy in their public key and shared secret key generation as shown
in Table 4.5. In the field Fp2s for the above mentioned isogeny computations [47], [69], Alice
computes 13 multiplications and 8 squarings whereas Bob computes 9 multiplications and
5 squarings only.
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4.5 Battery exhaustion experiment
A practical experiment was performed to determine the number of SIDH and
ECDH operations that can be performed on a laptop until its battery gets exhausted. We
have used an HP Pavilion Notebook with the specification of the processor as given in
Section 3.3, with a battery capacity of 60 Watt hours or 216 KJoules. Since the public
key generation and shared secret key generation in SIDH require different computations,
involving slightly different execution times, an average computation time is considered as
each SIDH operation. On average, the number of ECDH and SIDH operations that could
be performed until the battery power of the laptop was exhausted are around 3421000 and
84300 for 128 bits security. This finding is consistent with the Intel power gadget based
results reported in the previous section. Also as the bit security level changes from 128 to
192, the number of operations in either ECDH or SIDH that could be performed decreases
by around one third.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented the energy efficiency of standard projective
coordinate based elliptic curve computations compared to affine coordinates based similar
computations. Standard projective coordinates have been found to be significantly more
energy efficient than the affine coordinates. We have also reported energy consumption of
SIDH and ECDH implementations. Our results indicate that SIDH consumes about 45 to
55 times more energy than ECDH. Our findings also suggest that SIDH based on C-7512
will consume three to four times more energy than the one based on C-5032. We should
however note that, while SIDH is considered quantum-safe, ECDH is not. In addition
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to the relative energy (in)efficiency of SIDH compared to ECDH, we have reported their
actual energy consumption values. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that
such values are reported for SIDH. These values could be an important consideration in
the mode of deployment of SIDH in battery operated or energy constrained systems such
as hand-held devices, remote sensors and space satellites.
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Chapter 5
Energy consumption of NIST PQC
candidate algorithms
5.1 Overview
Quantum-safe cryptographic schemes are algorithms that are secure against at-
tacks by both classical and quantum computers. In recent years a lot of research has
been done on post-quantum cryptography. The motive behind such research is that, if
large scale quantum computers become a reality, then current cryptographic algorithms
would require replacement by quantum-safe cryptosystems. This is because quantum com-
puters would completely break all public-key cryptosystems in use today, namely RSA,
DSA [79], and elliptic curve cryptosystems. Therefore, before this situation turns more
critical, NIST has started the process of developing standards for post-quantum cryptog-
raphy [42]. Currently there are quite a few post-quantum cryptographic schemes such
as lattice-based, code-based, multivariate-based, hash-based cryptosystems etc. The new
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post-quantum cryptography standards will be used as quantum resistant counterparts to
existing standards, including digital signature schemes specified in Federal Information
Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 186 and key establishment schemes specified in
NIST Special Publications (SP) 800-56 A and B. Furthermore, this process would also help
in the transition from usage of public key cryptosystems to post-quantum cryptosystems,
before quantum computers become a reality.
At present, very few of the algorithms have been implemented in hardware.
Mostly all the candidates have presented their software implementations suitable for exe-
cution on 64 bit processors. Among the 69 initial submissions, around 22 were co-designed
by the PQCRYPTO group [68]. Some of those submissions also have implementations for
lower end processors such as ARM Cortex-M4. Since we were looking for a comprehensive
report based on all these submissions, only software implementations on 64 bit processors
are considered in this thesis.
All the submissions to the NIST post-quantum standardization process are avail-
able for public scrutiny and are being evaluated based on security, performance and other
properties by various stakeholders including the cryptographic community. Although not
explicitly part of the evaluation criteria, energy consumption due to the execution of cryp-
tographic algorithms is a very important consideration for battery operated devices such as
mobile phones and sensors [80], [102]. If an algorithm’s energy consumption on a certain
platform is known, then one can easily estimate how many times the algorithm can be
executed on the platform before its battery is completely exhausted, providing an added
aspect to be considered while deciding the deployment of the algorithm in energy con-
strained environments. Therefore, the idea of this investigation is to measure the energy
efficiency of each of these candidate algorithms. All submissions are available on the NIST
website [1] and include detailed description of the proposed algorithms along with refer-
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ence to relevant articles. For brevity, overviews of those algorithms are not provided in
this thesis.
All the implemented algorithms are executed for 100 iterations to measure their
execution time and also record their average power usage. Energy consumption is com-
puted using the execution time and average power usage data. In all the tables in this
chapter, execution time is reported in milliseconds and energy consumption is reported in
milliJoules.
5.2 Work process and methodology
According to the criteria set by NIST, there are broadly three different kinds of submissions:
 Public key signatures
 Public key encryption
 Key encapsulation mechanism
In signature schemes the subroutines that are benchmarked, their definitions are given
below:
i n t c r y p t o s i g n k e y p a i r ( unsigned char *pk , unsigned char * sk )
i n t c r y p t o s i g n ( unsigned char *sm , unsigned long long * smlen ,
const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen ,
const unsigned char * sk )
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i n t c rypto s i gn open ( unsigned char *m, unsigned long long *mlen ,
const unsigned char *sm , unsigned long long smlen ,
const unsigned char *pk )
They are responsible for private and public key pair generation, signing of message and
verification of the signature. Similarly, public key encryption schemes are supposed to
include key pair generation, encryption of the message to generate ciphertext and then
decryption of the ciphertext :
i n t c ryp to enc ryp t keypa i r ( unsigned char *pk , unsigned char * sk )
i n t c rypto encrypt ( unsigned char *c , unsigned long long * c len ,
const unsigned char *m, unsigned long long mlen ,
const unsigned char *pk )
i n t c rypto encrypt open ( unsigned char *m, unsigned long long
*mlen , const unsigned char *c , unsigned long long
c len , const unsigned char * sk )
Lastly, key encapsulation schemes are comprised of key pair generation, encapsulation of
the message and finally decapsulation:
i n t crypto kem keypai r ( unsigned char *pk , unsigned char * sk )
i n t crypto kem enc ( unsigned char * ct , unsigned char * ss ,
const unsigned char *pk )
i n t crypto kem dec ( unsigned char * ss , const unsigned char * ct ,
42
const unsigned char * sk )
NIST has also recommended some guidelines and format for these subroutines such as
additional functions that are to be used in these subroutines. The key pair generation sub-
routines require random input generation which is done using the SUPERCOP package [25].
In this study when these subroutines for key generation, encryption, encapsulation, sign-
ing etc. are benchmarked on the above mentioned processor, the whole subroutine’s power
usage and execution time is used to report the energy consumption. That is, in the power
usage and energy consumption results, the subroutine for random number generation’s
contribution is included. Moreover, NIST has provided its classification on the range of se-
curity strengths offered by the existing NIST standards in symmetric cryptography, which
is expected to offer significant resistance to quantum cryptanalysis. Five main security
levels [42] have been provided for this purpose as follows :
 Level I: It should be at least as hard as that of breaking the security of block ciphers
using exhaustive key search with 128 bit key, for example AES 128.
 Level II: It should be at least as hard as that of breaking the security of hash functions
using collision search with 256 bit hashed message digest, for example SHA256/
SHA3-256
 Level III: It should be at least as hard as that of breaking the security of block ciphers
using exhaustive key search with 192 bit key, for example AES 192.
 Level IV: It should be at least as hard as that of breaking the security of hash
functions using collision search with 384 bit hashed message digest, for example
SHA384/ SHA3-384
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 Level V: It should be at least as hard as that of breaking the security of block ciphers
using exhaustive key search with 256 bit key, for example AES 256.
Now, not all the candidate algorithms have implementations corresponding to the five above
mentioned security levels. In order to make a fair comparison of the schemes on the basis
of their power usage and energy consumption, they are grouped into different categories
that is encapsulation/encryption or signature and also in different security levels according
to availability in the submissions, as shown in the next section. It should be noted that
different schemes use different lengths of message according to their structure. Also in
signature scheme’s execution time and power usage depends on the length of the message
being signed. For the purpose of a consistent comparison, the largest message block size
mentioned in the supporting documentation, is considered during the benchmarking of the
signature scheme codes and also for its corresponding energy consumption.
The implementations submitted in this event include C codes as well as vec-
torised codes. Again not all submissions have provided vectorised instructions for speed
ups. Therefore, in order to make a reasonable comparison, the “optimized implementation”
of all the submissions are considered which only includes C implementation without any
vectorization. Some of the encryption/encapsulation submissions have provided implemen-
tations which are secure specifically against chosen ciphertext attack or chosen plaintext
attack. These schemes are separately evaluated based on their security against the attacks
as shown in the tables below. Also quite a few of the submissions have provided both en-
cryption and encapsulation algorithms, hence it can be seen that their submission names
are repeated in the tables for encapsulation and encryption. It should be noted that in
few of the submissions, there are algorithms with the same security levels but different
probability of error in decryption or verification etc. For such submissions, the algorithm
with the least probability of error is considered in this work.
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5.3 Energy efficiency
5.3.1 Public key signatures
Amongst the sixty four valid candidate algorithms, nineteen schemes include
signing and verification schemes as shown below in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. These tables
provide the energy consumption of the algorithms when they were executed on a 64 bit
processor laptop (Intel 6700 Skylake). We have observed that their power usages do not
vary much across all these schemes, and is generally around 24-28 Watts. The energy
consumption of the implementations is mostly influenced by their execution times. Some
submissions such as pqNTRUSign [41], SPHINCS Plus [28], Walnut [11], have provided
multiple variants of the same algorithm using different parameters. This report provides the
energy efficiency for all those variants as well. For a particular security level, amongst all
the algorithms submitted in the categories of signing, encryption or encapsulation etc., the
most energy efficient and the least ones are in bold characters. There are few submissions
of both signature schemes and encryption/encapuslation techniques, that have provided
implementation for the II and IV security levels. Therefore, we did not mark the most
energy efficient or the least ones in those categories. It should also be noted that there
are instances where multiple algorithms require almost similar execution time. This leads
to energy consumption values that are quite close, depending also upon their power usage
values. In that case we have provided the top five efficient algorithms in Tables 5.11, 5.10
and 5.12 with comparable energy consumption values.
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Table 5.1: Energy consumption during key generation of public key signature
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
CRYSTALSDilithium [54] 24.98 0.04 0.99 25.17 0.06 1.51 25.21 0.09 2.26 24.6 0.12 2.96 - - -
DRS [100] 25.34 452.02 11454. 18 - - - 25.77 454.12 11702.67 - - - 25.61 456.78 11698.13
DualModeMS [57] 26.41 698131 18437639.71 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALCON [60] 25.32 6.29 159.26 26.05 11.6 302.18 25.12 19.04 497.32
GeMSS [37] 26.67 33.43 891.57 - - - 25.93 142.34 3690.87 - - - 26.18 358.94 9397.04
Gravity SPHINCS [72] - - - 26.57 388.23 10315.27 - - - - - - - - -
Gui [98] 26.34 623 16409.82 - - - 26.12 25337 661802.44 - - - 25.7 92346 2373292.2
HiMQ3 [107] 24.88 0.02 0.49 - - - - - - - - - - - -
HiMQ3F 24.78 0.03 0.74 - - - - - - - - - - - -
LUOV [31] - - - 26.67 7 186.69 - - - 26.55 31.2 828.36 26.93 57.8 1556.554
MQDSS [43] - - - 26.12 0.85 22.2 - - - 26.62 1.97 52.44 - - -
pqNTRUSign Gaussian - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.13 48.75 1322.58
pqNTRUSign Uniform - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.05 47.34 1280.54
Picnic-FS [40] 25.67 0.005 0.13 - - - 25.92 0.016 0.41 - - - 25.34 0.032 0.81
Picnic-UR 27.05 0.004 0.1 - - - 26.93 0.017 0.46 - - - 27.13 0.04 1.08
Post-Quantum RSA Sign [29] - - - 27.45 1350.26 3706463.7 - - - - - - - - -
pqsigRM [81] 26.78 5260 140862.8 - - - 26.79 1026.17 27491.09 - - - 27.1 13553.2 367291.72
qTESLA [10] 26.85 0.94 25.23 - - - 26.66 1.39 37.05 - - - 27.11 2.94 79.7
RaCoSS [94] 25.74 200.4 5158.296 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rainbow [52] 27.13 367.33 9965.66 26.97 1449.09 39081.95 27.43 21248.7 582851.84 27.11 13801.8 374166.79 27.52 47220.97 1299521.09
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256F) [28] 26.38 2.75 72.545 - - - 26.86 4.99 134.03 - - - 27.11 18.76 508.58
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256S) 25.99 84.43 2194.33 - - - 26.32 163.73 4309.37 - - - 27.05 299.53 8102.28
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256F) 27.36 5.28 144.46 - - - 27.84 7.87 219.1 - - - 27.33 22.64 618.75
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256S) 26.98 171.35 4623.02 - - - 27.02 250.7 6773.91 - - - 26.94 320.33 8629.69
Walnut BKL [11] 26.53 0.27 7.16 - - - 26.67 0.6 16 - - - - - -
Walnut StochasticWrite 26.45 0.27 7.14 - - - 26.92 0.6 16.15 - - - - - -
Walnut Dehornoy 25.81 0.27 6.96 - - - 26.32 0.63 16.58 - - - - - -
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Table 5.2: Energy consumption during signing of public key signature schemes where
time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
CRYSTALSDilithium 26.78 0.18 4.82 27.32 0.3 8.19 26.89 0.42 11.29 25.12 0.41 10.29 - - -
DRS 27.34 22.9 626 - - - 26.81 25.51 683.91 - - - 27.11 26.28 712.45
DualModeMS 26.27 1846 48494.42 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALCON 26.73 0.145 3.87 - - - 26.88 0.23 6.18 - - - 27.01 0.28 7.56
GeMSS 26.79 318.96 8544.93 - - - 26.52 729.75 19352.97 - - - 27.18 1106.32 30069.77
Gravity SPHINCS - - - 26.73 1.68 44.9 - - - - - - - - -
Gui 25.83 31.4 811.06 - - - 26.12 11343 296279.16 - - - 26.78 474589 12709493.42
HiMQ3 25.87 0.012 0.31 - - - - - - - - - - - -
HiMQ3F 25.02 0.035 0.87 - - - - - - - - - - - -
LUOV - - - 25.88 26.8 693.58 - - - 26.11 80.6 2104.46 26.32 163.3 4298.05
MQDSS - - - 26.33 70.36 1852.57 - - - 26.48 222.43 5889.94 - - -
pqNTRUSign Gaussian - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.65 107.81 2873.13
pqNTRUSign Uniform - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.94 63.59 1713.11
Picnic-FS 27.54 3.2 88.12 - - - 26.33 12.38 325.96 - - - 26.94 47.25 1272.91
Picnic-UR 26.5 4.2 111.3 - - - 26.78 16.2 433.83 - - - 27.11 50.34 1364.71
Post-Quantum RSA Sign - - - 28.01 43.42 1216.19 - - - - - - - - -
pqsigRM 26.46 25684.8 679619.80 - - - 26.53 1846.5 49462.5 - - - 26.82 1754.8 47063.73
qTESLA 26.39 0.62 16.36 - - - 25.94 3.59 93.12 - - - 26.07 6.79 177.01
RaCoSS 26.26 10.15 266.53 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rainbow 25.72 0.21 5.4 26.01 0.53 13.78 25.97 3.2 83.1 26.14 2.31 60.38 26.1 3.87 101
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256F) 26.89 86.91 2337 - - - 26.2 137.33 3598.04 - - - 25.72 426.53 10970.35
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256S) 27.04 1298.11 35100.89 - - - 26.79 3527.1 94491 - - - 26.78 3641.14 97509.73
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256F) 28.06 153.93 4319.27 - - - 27.96 208.62 5833.01 - - - 28.12 512.84 14421.06
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256S) 25.74 2399.61 61765.96 - - - 26.14 5057.47 132202.26 - - - 26.37 3627.23 95650.055
Walnut BKL 27.15 20.19 548.15 - - - 26.73 69.71 1863.34 - - - - - -
Walnut StochasticWrite 26.93 9.56 257.45 - - - 27.18 25.47 692.27 - - - - - -
Walnut Dehornoy 27.43 9.1 249.61 - - - 26.87 24.4 655.62 - - - - - -
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Table 5.3: Energy consumption during verification of public key signature schemes
where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
CRYSTALSDilithium 26.13 0.04 1.04 25.97 0.07 1.81 25.38 0.10 2.53 24.67 0.13 3.2 - - -
DRS 26.34 222.71 5866.18 - - - 26.17 224.68 5879.87 - - - 25.69 226.95 5830.34
DualModeMS 26.36 1913 50426.68 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FALCON 25.83 0.025 0.64 - - - 26.13 0.044 1.15 - - - 26.93 0.052 1.4
GeMSS 27.19 0.067 1.82 - - - 26.82 0.143 3.83 - - - 26.87 0.394 10.58
Gravity SPHINCS - - - 26.69 0.01 0.26 - - - - - - - - -
Gui 27.25 0.045 1.23 - - - 26.88 0.347 9.32 - - - 27.12 0.689 18.68
HiMQ3 26.82 0.075 2.01 - - - - - - - - - - - -
HiMQ3F 24.89 0.087 2.16 - - - - - - - - - - - -
LUOV - - - 25.93 16.5 427.84 - - - 26.05 44.5 1159.22 26.31 83.9 2207.4
MQDSS - - - 27.11 52.35 1419.2 - - - 26.98 167.18 4510.51 - - -
pqNTRUSign Gaussian - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.11 1.25 33.88
pqNTRUSign Uniform - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.45 1.87 49.46
Picnic-FS 26.11 2.2 57.44 - - - 25.67 8.34 214.08 - - - 26.06 30.9 805.25
Picnic-UR 27.43 3.11 85.3 - - - 26.97 11.36 306.37 - - - 27.05 34.64 937.01
Post-Quantum RSA Sign - - - 28.05 5.78 162.13 - - - - - - - - -
pqsigRM 26.12 81.1 2118.33 - - - 26.45 58.57 1549.17 - - - 26.67 298.92 7972.19
qTESLA 27.32 0.12 3.28 - - - 27.26 0.25 6.81 - - - 26.96 0.32 8.63
RaCoSS 26.58 9.86 262.07 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rainbow 26.13 0.11 2.87 26.45 0.43 11.37 26.82 3.1 83.14 26.23 1.52 39.86 26.71 3.28 87.6
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256F) 26.63 3.65 97.2 - - - 26.41 7.37 194.64 - - - 25.89 10.57 273.65
SPHINCS Plus(SHA256S) 27.11 1.44 39.03 - - - 26.94 2.92 78.66 - - - 27.04 5.54 149.8
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256F) 25.34 6.57 166.48 - - - 26.08 11.2 292.09 - - - 26.12 12.2 318.66
SPHINCS Plus(SHAKE256S) 26.87 3.04 81.68 - - - 26.31 4.45 117.07 - - - 25.89 5.3 137.21
Walnut BKL 26.42 0.22 5.81 - - - 26.78 0.77 20.62 - - - - - -
Walnut StochasticWrite 27.02 0.11 2.97 - - - 27.31 0.31 8.46 - - - - - -
Walnut Dehornoy 26.91 0.12 3.23 - - - 27.33 0.35 9.56 - - - - - -
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Table 5.4: Energy consumption during key pair generation of public key encryption
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
Compact LWE [82] - - - - - - 26.93 0.163 4.39 - - - - - -
GiophantusR [5] 26.34 12.14 319.76 - - - 26.78 22.03 589.96 - - - 27.04 32.16 869.6
Guess Again [108] - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.67 38.7 1070.82
AKCN MLWE [122] - - - - - - - - - 26.89 0.153 4.11 - - -
KINDI-ENCRYPT [23] - - - - - - 26.53 0.07 1.85 - - - 26.71 0.16 4.27
LAC [84] - - - 28.1 0.026 0.73 - - - 27.88 0.085 2.36 27.87 0.088 2.45
LEDA PKC [18] 26.89 16.66 447.98 - - - 26.34 70.31 1851.96 - - - 26.88 201.562 5417.93
LIMA CCA [87] 27.17 0.42 11.41 27.03 0.77 20.81 27.56 0.86 23.7 - - - 27.45 1.53 41.99
LIMA CPA 26.94 0.42 11.31 27.04 0.77 20.82 26.76 0.86 23.01 - - - 27.02 1.53 41.34
Lizard CCA [44] 26.54 10.78 286.1 - - - 26.98 24.06 649.13 - - - 27.05 42.81 1158.01
RLizard CCA 26.78 0.04 1.07 - - - 26.93 0.08 2.15 - - - 27.04 0.1 2.7
LOTUS Encrypt [99] 27.09 9.79 265.21 - - - 26.63 18.91 503.57 - - - 27.15 26.34 715.13
McNIE 3Q [61] 27.17 109.1 2964.24 - - - 27.52 193.2 5316.86 - - - 28.2 336.78 9497.2
McNIE 4Q 26.89 95.02 2555.08 - - - 27.34 166.32 4547.18 - - - 27.97 336.72 9418.05
NTRUEncrypt PKE [66] 26.72 0.33 8.81 - - - 25.94 1.04 26.97 - - - 26.37 39.58 1043.72
Round2-u Encrypt [16] 27.14 0.25 6.78 26.88 0.42 11.29 27.07 0.58 15.7 27.45 0.6 16.47 27.62 0.62 17.12
Round2-n Encrypt 28.32 2.58 73.06 28.05 3.76 105.46 27.96 4.02 112.4 27.59 6.06 167.19 28.32 8.34 236.18
Titanium CPA [112] 27.14 0.61 16.55 - - - 27.39 0.6 16.43 - - - 27.26 0.85 23.17
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Table 5.5: Energy consumption during key pair encryption of public key encryption
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
Compact LWE - - - - - - 26.44 2.87 75.88 - - - - - -
GiophantusR 26.36 22.01 580.18 - - - 26.4 49.88 1316.83 - - - 26.43 78.99 2097.7
Guess Again - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.06 2634 71276.04
AKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 25.49 0.38 9.68 - - -
KINDI-ENCRYPT - - - - - - 27.11 0.09 2.43 - - - 26.68 0.2 5.33
LAC - - - 26.59 0.04 1.28 - - - 26.83 0.13 3.38 26.4 0.16 4.32
LEDA PKC 27.08 4.68 126.73 - - - 26.95 15.1 406.94 - - - 27.34 40.1 1096.33
LIMA CCA 26.33 0.37 9.74 26.67 0.68 18.13 26.7 0.75 20.02 - - - 26.73 1.41 37.68
LIMA CPA 27.53 0.38 10.46 27.74 0.69 19.14 27.56 0.77 21.22 - - - 27.5 1.4 38.5
Lizard CCA 26.89 0.02 0.54 - - - 27.45 0.048 1.31 - - - 27.32 0.07 1.91
RLizard CCA 27.16 0.02 0.54 - - - 27.2 0.05 1.36 - - - 27.35 0.07 1.91
LOTUS Encrypt 26.12 0.08 2.09 - - - 26.31 0.11 2.89 - - - 27.07 0.19 5.14
McNIE 3Q 26.81 1.03 27.61 - - - 26.53 2.09 55.44 - - - 26.71 3.12 83.33
McNIE 4Q 27.13 0.12 3.25 - - - 26.97 1.54 41.53 - - - 27.02 3.32 89.7
NTRUEncrypt PKE 26.86 0.06 1.61 - - - 0.09 2.41 - - - 26.49 61.66 1633.37
Round2-u Encrypt 27.68 0.31 8.58 27.21 0.52 14.15 27.32 0.69 18.85 27.16 0.74 20.09 27.54 0.77 21.2
Round2-n Encrypt 26.88 5.37 144.34 26.74 7.87 210.44 26.85 8.6 230.91 26.94 13.98 376.62 27.03 12.21 330.03
Titanium CPA 26.85 0.56 15.036 - - - 26.92 0.56 15.07 - - - 26.86 0.82 22.02
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Table 5.6: Energy consumption during key pair decryption of public key encryption
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
Compact LWE - - - - - - 26.59 0.35 9.3 - - - - - -
GiophantusR 26.56 41.31 1097.2 - - - 26.73 94.37 2522.51 - - - 26.83 151.34 4060.45
Guess Again - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.23 1.38 37.57
AKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 25.78 0.451 11.6 - - -
KINDI-ENCRYPT - - - - - - 26.83 0.11 2.95 - - - 25.94 0.25 6.48
LAC - - - 27.12 0.03 0.76 - - - 26.94 0.096 2.58 27.57 0.104 2.8
LEDA PKC 27.49 28.12 773 - - - 27.56 61.979 1708.14 - - - 27.72 167.18 4634.22
LIMA CCA 26.75 0.47 12.57 26.84 0.9 24.16 26.92 0.96 25.84 - - - 27.03 1.84 49.73
LIMA CPA 27.34 0.125 3.41 27.42 0.22 6.03 27.38 0.23 6.3 - - - 26.85 0.45 12.08
Lizard CCA 27.12 0.03 0.81 - - - 26.98 0.06 1.51 - - - 27.14 0.09 2.44
RLizard CCA 27.24 0.03 0.82 - - - 27.35 0.07 1.91 - - - 27.32 0.1 2.73
LOTUS Encrypt 26.43 0.13 3.43 - - - 26.37 0.24 6.32 - - - 26.61 0.41 10.91
McNIE 3Q 26.73 2.02 53.99 - - - 26.92 3.04 81.83 - - - 27.05 5.11 138.22
McNIE 4Q 27.32 1.05 28.68 - - - 27.35 2.04 55.79 - - - 27.29 5.04 137.54
NTRUEncrypt PKE 26.12 0.07 1.83 - - - 26.31 0.2 5.26 - - - 26.55 104.58 2776.59
Round2-u Encrypt 27.58 0.06 1.65 27.67 0.08 2.21 27.7 0.08 2.21 28.22 0.09 2.54 28.14 0.11 3.09
Round2-n Encrypt 26.89 8.1 217.8 26.92 11.96 321.96 27.02 12.67 342.34 27.56 19.95 549.82 27.45 19.1 524.3
Titanium CPA 27.13 0.09 2.44 - - - 27.31 0.1 2.73 - - - 26.98 0.15 4.05
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Table 5.7: Energy consumption during key pair generation of public key encapsula-
tion schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
BIGQUAKE [24] 26.36 301 7934.36 - - - 26.48 2754 72925.92 - - - 26.44 5171 136721.24
BIKE [12] 25.88 0.24 6.21 - - - 26.08 5.81 151.52 - - - 25.97 0.64 16.62
CFPKM [39] 26.71 183 4887.93 - - - 26.53 490 12999.7 - - - - - -
Classic McEliece [26] - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.59 936.11 25827.27
CRYSTALSKyber [35] 26.34 0.15 3.95 - - - 25.98 0.255 6.62 - - - 25.58 0.37 9.46
DAGS [19] - - - - - - 26.43 11.35 299.98 - - - 26.82 107.73 2889.31
DING [53] 27.17 1.42 38.58 - - - - - - - - - 26.98 2.77 74.73
DME [85] - - - - - - 25.72 25.79 663.31 - - - 25.82 95.51 2466.06
EMBLEM [106] 24.97 0.039 0.97 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FRODO [95] 26.13 0.373 9.74 - - - 26.57 0.745 19.79 - - - - - -
Hila5 [104] - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.05 1.29 34.89
HQC [89] 26.63 0.16 4.26 - - - 26.51 0.53 14.05 - - - 26.32 0.68 17.89
AKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 26.71 0.1 2.67 - - -
OKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 26.58 0.1 2.65 - - -
OKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - 25.93 0.13 3.37
AKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - 26.04 0.13 3.38
KINDI-KEM - - - - - - 27.13 0.07 1.89 - - - 27.04 0.16 4.32
LAKE [13] 26.73 0.61 16.3 - - - 26.19 0.7 18.33 - - - 26.81 0.65 17.42
LEDA KEM [17] 26.78 14.06 376.52 - - - 26.49 57.81 1531.38 - - - 26.79 176.042 4716.16
Lepton [121] 26.82 0.0084 0.22 - - - 26.92 0.0246 0.64 - - - 27.01 0.025 0.67
LIMA CCA 27.51 0.42 11.55 27.13 0.85 23.06 27.62 0.9 24.85 - - - 27.44 1.56 42.8
LIMA CPA 26.82 0.43 11.53 27.04 0.79 21.36 26.95 0.9 24.25 - - - 27.11 1.56 42.29
Lizard KEM 26.39 2.5 65.97 - - - 26.58 10.46 278.02 - - - 26.77 5.78 154.73
RLizard KEM 27.33 0.04 1.09 - - - 27.26 0.08 2.18 - - - 27.24 0.107 2.62
LOCKER [14] 27.14 2.96 80.33 - - - 26.92 3.35 90.18 - - - 27.05 3.6 97.38
LOTUS Kem 26.78 10.02 268.33 - - - 27.13 18.13 491.86 - - - 26.81 26.44 708.85
Mersenne-756839 [4] - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.81 6.02 161.39
NewHope CCA [9] 27.1 0.16 4.33 - - - - - - - - - 27.05 0.33 8.92
NewHope CPA 26.94 0.154 4.14 - - - - - - - - - 26.89 0.3 8.06
NTRUEncrypt KEM 26.71 0.33 8.81 - - - 26.77 0.83 21.41 - - - 28.68 39.79 1061.59
NTRU-HRSS-KEM [67] 27.11 53.74 1456.89 - - - - - - - - - - - -
NTRU Prime [27] - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.03 3.03 81.9
NTS-KEM [7] 26.93 16.54 445.42 - - - 26.58 44.98 1195.56 - - - 26.94 87.92 2368.56
Old Manhattan [101] 26.88 72.1 1938.04 - - - 27.05 139.2 3765.36 - - - 27.12 238.2 6459.98
Quroboros-R [88] 26.11 0.1 2.61 - - - 26.38 0.11 2.63 - - - 26.17 0.14 3.66
Post-Quantum RSA KEM - - - 26.53 1336.76 35464.24 - - - - - - - - -
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Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
QC-MDPC [117], [118] - - - - - - 26.67 87.03 2321.09 - - - - - -
Ramstake [113] 27.18 2.35 63.87 - - - 26.94 10.88 293.1 - - - - - -
RLCE-KEM [120] 26.85 390.06 10473.11 - - - 26.45 1554.88 41126.576 - - - 26.78 3853.39 103193.78
Round2-u KEM 26.41 0.14 3.69 26.11 0.14 3.65 26.32 0.65 17.10 26.57 0.5 13.28 26.39 0.29 7.65
Round2-n KEM 27.15 2.56 69.5 26.89 2.88 77.44 27.08 3.83 103.71 27.22 5.3 144.26 26.98 5.24 141.37
RQC [90] 27.06 0.27 7.3 - - - 26.82 0.45 12.06 - - - 27.14 0.76 20.62
SABER [49] 26.44 0.08 2.11 - - - 26.62 0.18 4.79 - - - 26.34 0.32 8.42
SIKE [69] 26.59 26.4 701.97 - - - 27.18 85.99 2337.2 - - - - - -
Three Bears [63] - - - 26.97 0.02 0.54 - - - 27.05 0.03 0.81 27.1 0.06 1.62
Titanium CCA 26.66 0.64 17.06 - - - 26.53 0.73 19.36 - - - 26.88 0.97 26.07
5.3.2 Public key encryption/encapsulation
Fourteen submissions focus on implementing public key encryption schemes with
quantum safe algorithms. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 provide the values of power usage,
execution time and energy consumption of these implemented schemes. The most/least
energy efficient in a particular group has been indicated with bold characters.
Around thirty nine submissions implemented public key encapsulation in this
PQC standardization process. Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 provide the values of energy con-
sumption corresponding for these schemes. Some candidate algorithms have provided both
encapsulation and encryption techniques. So the same submission name has been reported
for the different tables with the tags of -ENCRYPT or -KEM accordingly.
5.3.3 Other observations
In the previous subsections we have seen categorization of the submitted algo-
rithms based on their energy efficiency for a particular security level. Furthermore, broadly
all these algorithms come under the categories of well known post-quantum crypto tech-
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Table 5.8: Energy consumption during key encapsulation of public key encapsulation
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
BIGQUAKE 26.47 1.3 34.41 - - - 26.71 3.2 85.47 - - - 26.54 4.5 119.43
BIKE 25.88 0.229 5.95 - - - 26.11 0.23 6 - - - 26.08 1.1 28.68
CFPKM 26.41 188 4965.08 - - - 27.16 492 13362.72 - - - - - -
Classic McEliece - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.16 0.34 9.23
CRYSTALSKyber 27.12 0.22 5.96 - - - 27.98 0.336 9.4 - - - 27.08 0.47 12.72
DAGS - - - - - - 26.66 0.0096 0.256 - - - 25.89 0.026 0.673
DING 26.98 2.01 54.22 - - - - - - - - - 27.12 4.01 108.75
DME - - - - - - 26.18 0.12 3.19 - - - 26.07 0.847 22.08
EMBLEM 25.52 0.928 23.47 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FRODO 25.74 0.522 13.43 - - - 26.13 1.028 26.65 - - - - - -
Hila5 - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.69 1.23 32.82
HQC 25.73 0.4 10.29 - - - 26.18 0.94 24.6 - - - 26.42 1.3 34.34
AKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 27.1 0.12 3.25 - - -
OKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 26.49 0.13 3.44 - - -
OKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.53 0.21 5.57
AKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.79 0.23 6.16
KINDI-KEM - - - - - - 27.31 0.09 2.45 - - - 26.91 0.21 5.65
LAKE 25.92 0.11 2.85 - - - 26.31 0.11 2.89 - - - 26.44 0.12 3.17
LEDA KEM 25.84 2.083 53.82 - - - 26.21 13.542 354.93 - - - 26.1 35.417 924.38
Lepton 26.55 0.02 0.56 - - - 26.34 0.06 1.63 - - - 26.72 0.06 1.6
LIMA CCA 25.88 0.37 9.57 26.23 0.73 19.14 26.11 0.76 19.84 - - - 27.08 1.56 42.24
LIMA CPA 25.74 0.37 9.52 25.11 0.7 17.57 25.49 0.84 21.41 - - - 26.17 1.43 37.42
Lizard KEM 26.44 0.31 8.19 - - - 26.61 0.54 14.36 - - - 26.38 0.69 18.2
RLizard KEM 26.87 0.02 0.53 - - - 27.17 0.06 1.63 - - - 27.35 0.08 2.18
LOCKER 26.23 0.47 12.33 - - - 26.18 0.48 12.56 - - - 26.35 0.52 13.7
LOTUS Kem 26.72 0.08 2.13 - - - 26.63 0.11 2.92 - - - 27.91 0.19 5.3
Mersenne-756839 - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.71 9.23 246.53
NewHope CCA 27.32 0.25 6.83 - - - - - - - - - 26.85 0.5 13.425
NewHope CPA 26.59 0.22 5.84 - - - - - - - - - 27.16 0.4 10.86
NTRUEncrypt KEM 28.13 0.06 1.68 - - - 27.11 0.12 3.25 - - - 26.52 61.83 1639.73
NTRU-HRSS-KEM 26.53 1.23 32.63 - - - - - - - - - - - -
NTRU Prime - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.15 6.26 169.95
NTS-KEM 26.55 0.02 0.53 - - - 26.43 0.12 3.17 - - - 27.08 0.15 4.06
Old Manhattan 26.76 36.2 968.71 - - - 27.2 66.8 1816.96 - - - 27.23 147.34 4012.06
Quroboros-R 26.38 0.18 4.74 - - - 26.11 0.22 5.74 - - - 26.79 0.26 6.96
Post-Quantum RSA KEM - - - 26.66 8.39 223.67 - - - - - - - - -
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Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
QC-MDPC - - - - - - 26.52 6.05 160.44 - - - - - -
Ramstake 27.21 4.34 118.09 - - - 26.52 19.82 525.62 - - - - - -
RLCE-KEM 26.21 1.78 46.65 - - - 26.38 4.02 106.04 - - - 26.78 11.74 314.39
Round2-u KEM 27.18 0.34 9.24 26.87 0.57 15.31 27.24 2.71 73.82 27.18 0.44 11.95 26.95 0.59 15.9
Round2-n KEM 28.1 5.38 151.17 27.33 6.09 166.43 27.21 7.68 208.97 26.82 10.68 286.43 27.06 10.98 297.11
RQC 26.78 0.58 15.53 - - - 27.13 1.46 39.6 - - - 26.86 1.72 46.19
SABER 26.67 0.22 5.86 - - - 26.68 0.34 9.07 - - - 27.11 0.53 14.36
SIKE 27.06 43.22 1169.53 - - - 26.63 140.98 3754.29 - - - - - -
Three Bears - - - 26.54 0.04 1.06 - - - 26.68 0.04 1.06 26.32 0.08 2.1
Titanium CCA 25.86 0.59 15.25 - - - 26.14 0.67 17.51 - - - 26.44 0.92 24.32
niques such as lattice based, code based, multivariate, hash based etc. Few submissions
also correspond to some different techniques other than the aforementioned ones such as
GiophantusR [5] which deals with the underlying problem of solving indeterminate equa-
tions. In addition to that, the submissions such as Guess Again [108], Mersenne-756839 [4],
Picnic [40], Postquantum RSA [29], Walnut [11] etc. are based on some novel problem
which has not been explored before in any post-quantum cryptographic schemes. There-
fore, based on these underlying problem, Tables 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 again categorizes the
submitted algorithms and mentions the top five in each group which seems to be energy
efficient. It should be noted that these tables report the efficient algorithms considering
all the five security levels. In case of code based cryptography there are only two signa-
ture schemes pqsigRM [81] and RaCoSS [94], both of which require significant amount of
energy for their algorithm execution. Hence, they are not reported in Table 5.11. Also, for
multivariate based cryptosystems, there are only two encapsulation submissions, namely
CFPKM [39] and DME [85], again with the same issue of high energy consumption and as
a result omission from Table 5.12. In the category of hash-based cryptosystems, there are
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Table 5.9: Energy consumption during key decapsulation of public key encapsulation
schemes where time is in milliseconds, power in Watts and energy in milliJoules
Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
BIGQUAKE 26.53 1.6 42.44 - - - 26.38 10.2 269.07 - - - 26.57 14.7 390.58
BIKE 25.62 0.99 25.36 - - - 26.47 2.48 65.64 - - - 26.18 6.13 160.48
CFPKM 26.73 176 4704.48 - - - 26.52 502 13313.04 - - - - - -
Classic McEliece - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.24 82.78 2254.92
CRYSTALSKyber 25.92 0.266 6.89 - - - 26.08 0.404 10.53 - - - 25.28 0.555 14.03
DAGS - - - - - - 26.36 0.046 1.21 - - - 26.57 0.17 4.51
DING 26.56 1.33 35.32 - - - - - - - - - 26.73 2.59 69.23
DME - - - - - - 26.24 0.59 15.48 - - - 26.45 4.19 110.82
EMBLEM 25.77 0.96 2.73 - - - - - - - - - - - -
FRODO 26.14 0.52 13.59 - - - 26.26 1.03 27.04 - - - - - -
Hila5 - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.58 0.02 0.53
HQC 26.17 0.92 24.07 - - - 26.78 1.7 45.52 - - - 26.34 2.56 67.43
AKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 26.85 0.02 0.53 - - -
OKCN MLWE - - - - - - - - - 27.27 0.02 0.54 - - -
OKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - - 26.67 0.05 1.33
AKCN SEC - - - - - - - - - - - - 28.05 0.04 1.4
KINDI-KEM - - - - - - 26.81 0.12 3.21 - - - 26.86 0.25 6.71
LAKE 25.84 0.48 12.4 - - - 26.17 0.8 20.93 - - - 26.38 1.07 28.22
LEDA KEM 26.58 28.12 747.42 - - - 26.73 55.20 1475.49 - - - 26.37 154.16 4065.19
Lepton 26.83 0.02 0.53 - - - 26.71 0.07 1.87 - - - 26.93 0.07 1.88
LIMA CCA 25.94 0.47 12.19 26.16 0.94 24.59 26.47 0.98 25.94 - - - 25.83 1.9 49.07
LIMA CPA 26.68 0.125 3.33 26.43 0.23 6.07 27.11 0.24 6.5 - - - 26.86 0.45 12.08
Lizard KEM 26.47 0.36 9.52 - - - 26.73 0.66 17.64 - - - 27.23 0.81 22.05
RLizard KEM 27.13 0.03 0.81 - - - 27.23 0.07 1.9 - - - 26.93 0.11 2.96
LOCKER 26.46 1.73 45.77 - - - 26.38 1.78 46.95 - - - 26.51 2.39 63.35
LOTUS Kem 26.47 0.12 3.17 - - - 26.72 0.23 6.14 - - - 26.88 0.43 11.55
Mersenne-756839 - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.16 18.18 493.76
NewHope CCA 27.08 0.28 7.58 - - - - - - - - - 27.11 0.57 15.72
NewHope CPA 26.83 0.04 1.07 - - - - - - - - - 26.49 0.08 2.11
NTRUEncrypt KEM 27.87 0.08 2.22 - - - 27.43 0.17 4.66 - - - 27.71 109.1 3023.16
NTRU-HRSS-KEM 26.85 3.58 96.12 - - - - - - - - - - - -
NTRU Prime - - - - - - - - - - - - 27.23 9.35 254.6
NTS-KEM 26.48 0.2 5.29 - - - 26.67 0.36 9.6 - - - 26.95 0.83 22.36
Old Manhattan 27.16 40.17 1091.01 - - - 27.32 79.8 2180.13 - - - 26.85 163.32 4385.14
Quroboros-R 26.56 0.41 10.88 - - - 26.47 0.78 20.64 - - - 26.81 1.12 30.02
Post-Quantum RSA KEM - - - 26.75 46.99 1256.98 - - - - - - - - -
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Scheme Security level I Security level II Security level III Security level IV Security level V
Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy Power Time Energy
QC-MDPC - - - - - - 27.13 71.8 1947.93 - - - - - -
Ramstake 27.02 8.92 241.01 - - - 27.31 38.46 1050.34 - - - - - -
RLCE-KEM 26.86 3.48 93.47 - - - 26.53 8.29 219.93 - - - 26.57 26.51 704.37
Round2-u KEM 27.04 0.13 3.51 27.12 0.35 9.49 26.96 1.93 52.03 27.15 0.34 9.23 27.26 0.28 7.63
Round2-n KEM 27.86 2.62 72.99 28.12 3.66 102.91 27.94 4.03 112.6 28.14 5.84 164.34 28.23 5.71 161.2
RQC 26.73 1.54 41.16 - - - 26.37 3.95 104.16 - - - 27.08 4.88 132.15
SABER 27.17 0.27 7.33 - - - 26.84 0.52 13.95 - - - 27.18 0.71 19.29
SIKE 26.86 46.11 1238.51 - - - 27.24 151.85 4136.4 - - - - - -
Three Bears - - - 26.76 0.05 1.34 - - - 26.92 0.06 1.61 26.58 1.06 28.17
Titanium CCA 26.13 0.68 17.76 - - - 26.57 0.77 20.45 - - - 25.93 1.07 27.74
Table 5.10: The energy efficient lattice based cryptographic algorithm submissions
Signing Encapsulation/Encryption
Key Generation Sign Verify Key Generation Enc Dec
CRYSTALSDilithium CRYSTALSDilithium CRYSTALSDilithium EMBLEM, KCL, Lizard, Lepton, Lepton, KCL
- - - Lizard, Lepton, LAC, KINDI, New Hope CPA,
- - - Round 2, LAC LOTUS Lizard, Round 2-u
two submissions namely Gravity - SPHINCS [72] and SPHINCS Plus [28], both consuming
quite an amount of energy. And SIKE [69] is the only submission for supersingular elliptic
curve isogeny based cryptography SIDH.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have reported the energy consumption of all the NIST round
1 candidate algorithms [1], when they are executed on 64 bit Intel 6700 Skylake Processor,
3.4 GHz. We have consolidated our energy consumption data based on security levels and
cryptographic operations. An overwhelming majority of the candidate algorithms are cate-
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Table 5.11: The energy efficient code based cryptographic algorithm submissions
Encapsulation/Encryption schemes
Key Generation Enc Dec
OuroborosR, HQC, NTS-KEM, LAKE, OuroborosR, LAKE,
BIKE, RQC, LAKE OuroborosR, BIKE, Hila5, DAGS,
Classic McEliece, DAGS NTS-KEM
Table 5.12: The energy efficient multivariate based cryptographic algorithm submissions
Signature schemes
Key Generation Sign Verify
HiMQ3, HiMQ3F Rainbow, HiMQ3, HiMQ3F Gui, GeMSS,
HiMQ3, HiMQ3F
gorized as either lattice, code or multi-variate based, and we identify leading energy efficient
schemes from each category. There have been reports published analyzing the technicalities
of these submissions. For example Martin et al. [8] investigated the lattice based cryptosys-
tem’s asymptotic run time. However, except for [20] where we compare energy efficiency
of the classical elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) relative to SIDH/SIKE, there has
not been any prior evaluation of energy consumption of the NIST round 1 post-quantum
candidate algorithms.
In certain applications, energy constrained devices will perform signing and de-
cryption operations while the more powerful servers will verify and encrypt. From Table
5.2, one can compute the median energy consumption for Level I signing algorithms to
be 266.53 milli Joules and the corresponding algorithm is RaCoSS [94]. A practical ex-
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periment was performed to determine the number of signing operations for this particular
submission RaCoSS, that can be performed on the same processor (as mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.3 with a battery capacity of 60 Watt hours or 216 KJoules) until its battery gets
exhausted. The experimental results showed around 800,000 signing operations, which is
consistent with the Intel power gadget based results reported in the table.
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Chapter 6
Concluding remarks
6.1 Summary and deductions
In this thesis, we have considered the energy consumed by various public key
cryptosystems when they are executed on a 64 bit general purpose processor. To this end,
first the power usage of the cryptosystems has been tracked using the Intel power gadget
and then the energy consumed is determined by multiplying the average power usage and
the execution time.
We have reported energy consumption of elliptic curve point addition and dou-
bling for ECDH and SIDH when the curve points are represented using affine and projective
coordinate systems. We have also compared ECDH with SIDH in terms of their energy con-
sumption. Finally, we have reported a comprehensive comparison of the energy consumed
by the NIST round 1 PQC candidate algorithms.
Our results show that projective coordinates are around 45 to 65 times more
energy efficient than affine based representation. The operation of inversion, required in
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case of affine representation of coordinates, is implemented using Fermat’s little theorem.
Perhaps this algorithm is not a very efficient technique for this operation and as a result
have increased execution time and energy consumption for affine based representation by
a huge amount. In terms of the overall key exchange scheme, ECDH is around 45 to 55
times more energy efficient that SIDH for both the aforementioned security levels. Finally,
our results indicate that some of the NIST PQC candidate algorithms are more energy
efficient that the classical ECDH.
6.2 Future work
As can be seen from the previous chapters, the variations in power usages by the
cryptographic schemes considered here are mostly small. An algorithm’s energy consump-
tion is the product of its average power usage and the execution time. We do not expect
the power usages to vary considerably if an algorithm undergoes further optimization. As
a result, algorithm optimization based reduction in execution time is likely to yield roughly
a proportionate reduction in energy consumption, assuming the same C based implemen-
tation.
Vectorized and/or floating-point instruction based implementations add another
degree of freedom to the effort of reducing execution time and energy consumption. Vec-
torized and floating-point instructions use some part of the processor that are not used by
regular integer instructions. So, investigating the relative energy efficiencies of the candi-
date algorithms from PQC NIST submissions for the vectorized implementations would be
interesting.
In this work, only standard projective coordinates and affine coordinates are ex-
plored for energy consumptions. Other coordinate systems could be used to implement the
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key exchange and then an analogous comparative analyis can be performed. Also in case of
comparison between affine and projective coordinate based representations, the inversion
operation for affine coordinates could be computed using more efficient algorithms such as
extended Euclidean algorithm, binary gcd algorithm etc. [64]
In this work, software implementations on 64 bit processors have been investi-
gated. It is not known with certainty if similar relative energy efficiency will hold for
implementations on processors with different data paths such as 8, 16, or 32 bit proces-
sors. Additionally, hardware based implementations of the above mentioned cryptographic
schemes could be compared for energy consumption.
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